Here, we present a theoretical analysis of the relationship between the market and the coordination game in our experiments. This analysis motivates the predictions that we present in the paper. As we describe in the main body, players participate in a two-stage game consisting of an asset market followed by an order-statistic coordination game. The values of the securities traded in the asset market depend upon the realization of the output (order statistic) in the coordination game.
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2) Suppose that all other players k = i are playing e k = m as described by the Nash equilibrium, then for all 1 < j < n and all e i m j (e) = m or the order statistic is invariant in the single player's choice of input so player i's payoff function is given by:
(2) π i (e i ; e −i = m, x i ) = a + b 0 m − c |m − e i | + βx mi which is obviously maximized by i selecting e i = m regardless of the asset allocation.
When output is determined by the minimum input j = 1, this proposition tells us that the asset market can directly alter the incentives and equilibrium outcomes of the game. When a particular player has enough of an asset that pays off under lower output (relative to higher output assets), he or she has a weakly dominant strategy to play the corresponding lower input, thus making the higher output equilibrium impossible to support. Thus, the lowest input choice, e i = 1, by all players is the only Nash equilibrium that exists for every possible asset portfolio. For higher output outcomes, the relative payoff of the asset market (β) to the coordination game (b) determines the asset portfolios that are consistent with Nash equilibrium of the market-modified game. However, when the output is determined by any order statistic other than the minimum (j > 1), players' asset holdings do not affect the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria nor their efficiency properties. Thus, any influence upon the outcome of the game produced by the asset markets must come from the markets' influence upon players' beliefs about the play of others or the addition of payoff asymmetries due to different asset holdings.
One factor that may significantly improve coordination on Pareto-efficient outcomes is communication through prices and other market activity. Given that there is no generally agreed upon model of asset market activity, and therefore no model of how such activity influences coordination, we explore the relationship between market communication and beliefs in our framework. We begin by positing a model that is consistent with the stylized details of strategic uncertainty in the coordination game. Suppose that each player has some beliefs about the output, m j (e), that will be observed, where µ i (m|e i ) indicates player i's belief that m j (e) = m given her intended input choice of e i . The usual interpretation of coordination failure arising due to strategic uncertainty in this game is that each player recognizes that high output is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, but their beliefs about the choices of others players may make it rational for players to select e i < M . Specifically, a player's expected payoff from his or her input choice given this strategic uncertainty is:
If players maximize their expected utility with respect to these preferences, then they may decide to play input levels other than the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Let µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) be the set of beliefs for all agents. Then we say that e * = (e * 1 , . . . , e * n ) is an equilibrium given beliefs µ if e * i maximizes (3) for all i. Players maximizing with respect to these beliefs provide an explanation for inefficiency in coordination games. If a player's beliefs place sufficient likelihood on low input choices by other players, the player will prefer low input and the resulting outcome may yield an output level below the Pareto-optimal equilibrium.
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The market, like any communication device, may provide an opportunity for players to refine their beliefs prior to playing the game. Let p m be the market price for the asset X m that pays β in the event that the output is m. Rational expectations equilibrium represents the conclusion of a market communication process whereby by players' beliefs might be communicated and/or influenced by market prices. A rational expectation equilibrium in this context must also entail second-stage input choices that are consistent with expected payoff maximization given beliefs. We say that (x * , p * , e * ) is a rational expectations equilibrium if there exist beliefs µ such that:
If there are no restrictions on the set of allowable beliefs, there are many potential rational expectations equilibria. As is typical in rational expectations type equilibria, we focus on prices that reveal information to the agents. A rational expectations equilibrium is revealing if the beliefs that support the equilibrium are given by µ i (m|e i ) = p m / M =1 p for all i, or beliefs are simply given by the observed normalized prices. Further, the equilibrium is said to be fully revealing if there exists an output level m such that p m = β so µ i (m|e i ) = 1 and for all = m, p = 0 so µ i ( |e i ) = 0 for all i. In the event of a fully revealing equilibrium, all strategic uncertainty is resolved and the resulting input choices must constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game. If markets are an effective communication tool for obtaining efficient coordination they should admit fully revealing rational expectations equilibria that result in high output. The next proposition characterizes the equilibria.
PROPOSITION 2:
1) If m 1 (e), then all fully revealing rational expectations equilibria involve e * i = 1 for all i.
2) If m j (e) with 1 < j < n, then e * i = m for all i and for m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M } is a fully revealing equilibrium.
PROOF:
Address each part in turn:
1) We need to show that e i = 1 is an equilibrium and any other matched effort level cannot be an equilibrium. a) To show that e i = 1 for all i is an equilibrium let e k = 1 for all k = i and note that m 1 (e) = 1, δ 1 (e) = 1, and δ (e) = 0 for all = 1 and for all e i .
2 There is also another potential source of inefficiency, which involves mismatched choices, or "wasted input," by players. Of course, via repeated interaction players will refine their beliefs to be consistent with the observed history of play, resulting in convergence in beliefs and actions to a particular Nash equilibrium. Vincent Crawford (1995) proposes a model that formally interacts learning dynamics with strategic uncertainty in these kinds of games. Vincent Crawford and Bruno Broseta (1998) apply this kind of model to the experiment of John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio and Richard O. Beil (1993) .
Given fully revealing prices and beliefs player i's choice of input and assets must maximize:
which is obviously minimized at any selection of x i and e i = 1 so any allocation such that e i = 1 for all i can be supported as a fully revealing equilibrium. b) To show that no higher output level can be achieved as a fully revealing equilibrium suppose that one exists and find a contradiction. Suppose there exists a fully revealing equilibrium with x * and e * i = m > 1 for all i. Then e * i and x * i must joint maximize:
Consider the alternative input for player i of e i = 1 and any allocation such that x i − x mi > b0 β (m − 1), then we have the following:
or playing low input and buying sufficient excess amounts of the (free) asset provides greater utility than the proposed equilibrium. Thus we have a contradiction.
2) To show that e i = m for all i and for all m is an equilibrium let e k = m for all k = i and note that m j (e) = m, δ m (e) = 1, and δ (e) = 0 for all = m and for all e i . Given fully revealing prices and beliefs player i's choice of input and assets must maximize:
which is obviously minimized at any selection of x i and e i = m so any allocation such that e i = m for all i can be supported as a fully revealing equilibrium.
In the minimum-input (j = 1) game, any player can unilaterally assure that the final output is 1 by selecting e i = 1, therefore the only prices that are consistent at both stages of the game must price the low output at β. If the price of the low output asset is lower than β then any player can profit by buying units of the low output asset; once she has a sufficient number of these low output assets it is a weakly dominant strategy to select the low input level e i = 1. On the other hand, when j > 1, since the player cannot directly influence the order statistic and hence the output, any price that resolves uncertainty on a particular equilibrium output level can be consistent with equilibrium play in the second-stage coordination game.
Let (x * , e * ) be the portfolio and input choices from a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium identified above. While these equilibria suggest the types of outcomes that are consistent with both the information aggregation properties of the market and the strategic interaction properties of the game, they do not account for the fact that the information provided by the market might in reality be noisy or that some small "doubt" regarding other players' intended actions might still persist . We want to examine properties of these equilibria when players have some small doubt regarding the actual choices of other group members. In particular, if m j (e * ) = m then she believes there is an < .5 probability that any individual independently selects either m + 1 or m − 1.
3 Specifically we define ρ( ) to be the probability that any single individual selects input , thus we assume the following:
Given this belief structure, µ i (m j |e i ) is generated by particular combinations of the binomial distribution and characterized in Table I where µ i (m|e i ) is obviously defined as 1−µ i (m−1|e i )−µ i (m+1|e i ). Importantly, note that µ i (m−1|m) = µ i (m−1|m+1) and
Similarly, µ i (m + 1|m) = µ i (m + 1|m − 1) and µ i (m + 1|m + 1) = µ i (m + 1|m) + δ 2 where
We assume all subjects have the same beliefs and examine the conditions under which the previously identified allocations and input choices that are fully revealing rational expectations remain rational expectations equilibrium when players have doubt as described above.
We can now define each agent's expected payoffs given these beliefs to be given by 3 We examine only single step jumps in input for analytic tractability. The qualitative nature of these results should persist for more general types of beliefs. 
Eπ(e i , x i ) for the following three relevant input level choices:
It is clear that in the context of rational expectation equilibria defined earlier that each player will select e i , x i to maximize Eπ(e i , x i ) − M =1 p x i subject to the player's budget constraints.
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If even one agent assigns some small amount of strategic uncertainty to the choices of other players, and this uncertainty influences either market or game behavior to move the group away from the particular equilibrium outcome of the game, then this equilibrium is extremely fragile. Let (x * , e * , p * ) be a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium where p * m = β and 0 otherwise and e * i = m for all i. Then allow one player to have a small amount of doubt in the form described above. We say that an equilibrium is stable if for all < there exists an allocation x such that (x , e * , p * ) remains a rational expectations equilibrium given these new beliefs. In other words, as long as the amount of doubt is sufficiently small, no player has an incentive to buy or sell assets such that she now also wants to select a different input level. An equilibrium is unstable if for any > 0 the individual profit maximizing choice of x i and e i entails e i = e * i . The following proposition characterizes the stability properties of these games: PROPOSITION 3: Let (x * , e * , p * ) be a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium under m j (e). Then: 1) If j = 1, then all fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are stable.
2) If 1 < j < n then any fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium is unstable.
Further,
2 then the agent with doubt will always select a maximizing input and allocation combination that involves lower input or e i = m − 1.
b) If
n+3 2 ≤ j < n, then the agent with doubt will always select a maximizing input and allocation combination that involves higher input or e i = m + 1.
PROOF:
We begin by showing that any fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium is stable when j = 1. Note that by the earlier proposition all fully revealing equilibria when j = 1 involve e * i = 1 for all i. Given an allocation x * , the relevant expected payoffs are given by:
Player i will prefer to select e i = 2 if and only if Eπ(2, x * i ) ≥ Eπ(1, x * i ) which is only true if
Therefore let be less that this value. Then for any < player i will prefer to play the original input e * i = 1 and further the marginal value of holding additional units of x 2 is zero and the marginal value of holding additional units of x 1 is 1 so the agent is indifferent between the equilibrium asset allocation x * i and any other allocation. Next, we show that for 1 < j < n any fully revealing equilibrium is unstable. Let 1 < j ≤ n−1 2 . We demonstrate that the equilibrium is unstable via the following two steps. First, we show that for any the agent prefers to buy units of x m−1 regardless of his current utility maximizing plan of action. Second, we show that if the agents purchases enough x m−1 he will eventually prefer to play e i = m − 1.
First, given that the market price of both x m−1 and x m+1 is p * m−1 = p * m = 0, the agent should buy (infinitely) many units of whichever asset, given his plan of action e i most greatly increases his expected utility. Note that
2 obviously implies that j ≤ n − j − 1 and we have that
It follows similarly that µ i (m−1|m) > µ i (m+1|m) and µ i (m−1|m−1) > µ i (m+1|m−1).
Second, since
know that eventually the expected payoff from playing e i = m − 1 will eventually surpass that of either m or m + 1. For n+3 2 ≤ j < n, show similarly that playing e i = m + 1 will eventually be preferred. The first part of the proposition confirms the intuition that low input choices under the minimum order statistic output are indeed stable. This stems from the fact that, in equilibrium, all allocations must be such that either the agent has a weakly dominant strategy to play e i = 1, or, if not, then playing e i = 1 is still a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, given that µ i (2|1) = 0 in the minimum-input game, the agent has no incentive to purchase x 2 assets unless he or she actually plans on playing e i = 2. This only happens when there is sufficient doubt > .
The second part of the proposition demonstrates that for higher order statistics the stability properties are quite different. Namely, any equilibrium is unstable to doubt as we have defined it since there is always a greater marginal value of purchasing assets associated with m − 1 or m + 1 than the zero prices on them. Since this marginal value is non-decreasing, the agent's demand is unbounded and she will always prefer some alternative input choice. Further we show that the expected deviations associated with low order statistics is always downward whereas the expected deviations associated with high order statistics is always upward. But the bounds provided in the proposition are not tight and there may exist j whereby the prediction of deviation is unclear. For example, if j = 2 then we know that for n = 6 if there is doubt we would expect players to prefer investment (and subsequent choice) in downward input from any equilibrium involving matched input greater than 1. However, for n = 3, neither of the conditions are satisfied and the effect of doubt is unclear. This is because at the median (as j = 2 is for n = 3) the deviations by others needed to either raise or lower the level of output are symmetric.
We can also examine the impact of similar doubt under the Control treatment where there is no market by forcing all trading portfolios x i = 0. For any combination of orderstatistic j and number of players n, there exists an such that if all players are playing some matched input level m then if < the player with doubt will continue to prefer to play e i = m despite this doubt. However, if > the player will prefer to play either lower (e i = m − 1) input or higher (e i = m + 1) input. Table I contains a description of the cutoffs for the variants observed in our experiments. Importantly, in all cases, the amount of doubt that is needed to lead away from equilibrium is non-negligible. In contrast, the previous proposition tells us that any level of doubt with j = 2 will result in the player with doubt taking actions that will move the results away from the equilibrium and most likely in favor of lower input/output combinations. Table 2 -under the Control treatment such that if > the player will prefer to deviate from the matched equilibrium strategy of e i = m for all players. The arrow indicates the direction of deviation by the player. When the direction of deviation is not feasible (m = 1 or m = M ) the other direction of deviation is only favored for unfeasible > .5. 
II. Experiment Instructions

IV. Data Tables
